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The paper examines the nature of optimal policy intervention required in the exporting country 
when tlpzre is the possibility of a market-disruption-induced trade restriction being invoked by 
tki: irrt.;; 4ng country. The analysis is conducted primarily with a two-period model, with and 
2:. : &x; :: .9justment costs, and the results are related to the well-known policy prescriptions of 
+ !I..~ ~JP ;:., Ramaswami, Srinivasan, Johnson et al. in the theory of trade and welfare, The last 
section extends the argument briefly to steady state analysis. The applicability of the analysis 
to the qynmetric, embargo problem is also noted. 
The fact that ‘market disruption’ permits or prompts importing countries to 
invoke quantitative import restrictions <or, what is more fashionable in recent 
times, voluntary export restrictiors by the exporting countries, at the urging 
of the importing countries) immediately implies that the exporting country 
faces a situatiorr of endogenous uncertainty: its own export level can affect he 
probability of such quantitative restrictions (QR’s) being imposed. It simul- 
taneously raises the following analytical questions which have obvious policy 
implications : 
(1) What is the optimal trade policy for an exporting corrvtry which is faced 
by such potential QR-intervention? 
(2) Since the possibility of such QR-intervention must restrict he trade oppor- 
tunity set relative to that which would obtain in the absence of the QR- 
*The research underlying this paper was financed partly by UNCTAD, through its Manu- 
factures Division; needless to say, the paper does not necessarily represent the views of the 
UNCTAD Secretariat. Cur thanks are due to Peter Diamond, Murray Kemp, Paul Krugman, 
Clive Bell, Charles Blitzer, Graham Pyatt, and Wolfgang Mayer for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. 
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possibility, can one meaningfully define the loss that such a QR-possibility 
imposes on the exporting country and therefore the compensation that could 
be required to be paid to the exporting country under, say, a modified set 
of GATT rules? 
2, Optimal trade policy: Two-period model with zero adjustment costs 
To analyze the problem of optimal trade policy for the exporting country in the 
presence of a market-disruption-induced possibility of QR-intervention, we will 
Peploy the usual trade-theoretic model of general equilibrium, but will extend 
it to a two-period framework in sections 2-5. In section 4, we will also introduce 
adjustment costs, beginning with a simple formulation which has putty in 
period 1 and clay in period 2, and then extending the analysis in section 5 to 
lesser igidity of redeployment of resources in period 2. In section 6, we will 
consider a steady state with an infinite time horizon rather than a two-period 
analysis, so that we can analyze the effects of continuous uncertainty (as against 
just period-l uncertainty). 
Thus, consider atwo-commodity model of international trade. We then assume 
a two-period time horizon such that the level of exports E in the first period 
aEects the probability P(iE) of a quota E being imposed at the beginning of the 
next period.’ 
Let UIC1, C,] be the standard social utility function defined in terms of the 
consumption Cf of commodity i (i = I, 2). By assumption, it is known at the 
beginning of the next period whether the quota E has been imposed or not. 
Thus, the policy in the next period will be to maximize U subject o the trans- 
formation function F[X,, X2] = 0 and the terms of trade function s if no 
quota is imposed, and with an additional constraint E ;5 E if the quota is 
imposed. 
Let now the maximal welfare with and without he quota be u and B respec- 
tively. Clearly then, we have 0 > ,U when the quota is binding. The expected 
welfare in the second period is then clearly 
-The objective function for the first period is therefore : 
4 = U&-E, x,+nE]-)_g[_UP(E)+27(1-P(E)}], 
WCs method of introducing market disruption presupposes that the QR-level is prespecified 
but that the probability of its being imposed will be a function of how deeply the market is 
penetrated in the importing country and therefore how effective the import-competing in- 
dustry’s pressure for protection will be vis-a-vis the importing country’s government. The effect 
of modifying this simplieing assumption so as to allow for varying levels of a quota is noted 
later in this section. 
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where p is the discount factor. This is then to be maximized subject o the 
domestic transformation constraint, F[X, , &] = 0. In doing this, assume that 
P(E) is a convex function of E’* i.e. the probability of a quota being imposed 
increases, at an increasing rate as E is increased, and that, in the case where 
z depends on E, nEis concave in E. Then, the first-order conditions for an interior 
maximum are: 
- = v,-AF, = 0, 
ax, 
- = - Ul + v,{lt+ En’}-p(fi-_U)P’(E) = 0. 
8E (3) 
Now, eqs. (1) and (2) yield the familiar result that the marginal rate of sub-’ 
stitution in consumption equals the marginal rate r,; transformation. Eq. (3) 
moreover can be written as 
I 
(3 ) 
If(i) monopoly TJower is absent (IC’ = 0) and if (ii) the first period’s exports do 
not affect the probability of a quota being imposed in the second period, the1 
(3’) clearly reduces to the standard condition that the marginal rate of substitution 
in consuption equals the (average = marginal) terms of trade. If (i) does not 
hold but (ii) holds, then LT /V, equals the marginal terms of trade (7~ z’E), 
leading to the familiar o+ f ‘I W+_W tariff. If both (i) and (ii) are present, here is an 
additional tariff element : i; 1 f tJ -tJ]/V2)P’Q.’ This term can be explained as 
follows: if an additional unit of exports takes place in period 1, thr;: probability 
of a quota being imposed and hence a discounted loss in welfare of p(& y) 
occurring, increases by P’(E). Thus, at the margin, the expected loss in welfare is 
p(b,U)P’(E) since there is no loss in welfare if the quota is not imposed. 
Converted to numeraire terms, this equals [p(&_U)P’(E)]/U2, and must be 
subtracted from the marginal terms of trade (z + n/E), the effect of an additional 
unit of exports on the quantum of imports.2 
“Instead of assuming that the fixed quota of I!? will be imposed with probability P(E), one 
could assume that a quota of J!? will be imposed with probability density P@, E). In oTher 
words, the quota level J!? is variable and the probability of imposition depends both on the 
level E and on the quantum of exports E in the first period. Let f(E) denote the maximurn of 
U(C, , C2) subject o F(XI ,X2) = 0 and El 6 g, where CI = (XI -&) and Cz = (X2 + k&). 
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It is then clear that the market-disruption-induced QR-possibility requires 
optimal intervention i  the form of a tariff (in period 1). It is also clear that, 
compared to the optimal situation without such a QR-possibility, the resource 
allocation in the QR-possibility case will shift against exportable production, i.e. 
comparative advantage, in the welfare sense, shifts away, at the margin, from 
exportable production. Moreover, denoting the utility level under the optimal 
policy intervention with quota possibility as & OPT, that under laissez f4re with 
the quota possibility as 46, and that under laissez faire without this quota 
possibility as &, we can argue that 
This result is set out, with the attendant periodwise utility levels achieved under 
each option, in table 1 (which is self-explanatory).3 
For the case of a small country, with no monopoly power in trade (except for 
the quota possibility), the equilibria under alternative policies are illustrated in 
fig. 1.’ Thus, U rer tsents the utility level in the absence of a quota, U the utility 
level when the quota is imposed, and U* the first-period utility level reached 
under the optimal policy intervention option. Note that equilibrium with U* 
naturally requires that the export level Is being restricted below the level that 
would be reached with nonintervention (at C!, w,hile xceeding the level reached 
in equilibrium when the quota is invoked (at y). Also, note that the optimal 
policy for restricting the first-period level of exports is a tariff: a conclusion that 
is, of course, familiar from the theory of optimal intervention under noneconomic 
objectives as considered in Johnson (1965) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
(1969). 
Then the expected welfare in period 2, given the export level E in the first period, is Jf(E) 
P(g, E) dE. Let us denote this by h(E). Thus the maximand 4now becomes U[Xl -E, X2 + n.E] 
+ph(E) and cond%ion (3’) becomes WI/Z& = 7~ +A’ES @‘(I?)/&. Now h’(E) is the change 
in expected welfare in period 2 due to an additional unit of export in period 1 and this has to 
be added to the marginal terms of trade n+n’E. Nothing substantive therefore changes. Note 
however that if we allow for many exporting countries and if the share in the overall quota level 
gra&ted in period 2 to one exporting country will increase with the export level achieved by that 
country in period I, this would produce an incentive to increase, rather than decrease, the export 
level in period 1, ceteris paribus. Hence, our analysis based on one exporting country ntiuld 
riced to be modified correspondingly. 
3However, we cannot assert hat gLNq > &OPT except in the case of a small countty with 
no ilrrflueace on the terms of trade; this follows from the fact that $LN~ is no longer the first- 
best policy in the presence of monopoly pawer in trade, so that U* may well exceed 0 in 
table 1, 
4NeedIess to say, for a country with no monopoly power, it is not meaningful to think of 
market-disruption leading to QR’s: if the country is indeed atomistic in foreign markets, its 
exports urely will not cause market disruption. Our analysis, of course, allows for monopoly 
power; only fig. 1 illustrates the simple case of a small country. 
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Table 1 
Alternative outcomes under different policies.a 




Laissez faire with 
possible quota 
Laissez faire 
with no quota 
possibility 









_V is utility level if quota is imposed. 
0 is utility level if quota is not imposed. 
U* is utility level with optimal policy intervention when quota can be 
imposed in second period. 
P(E) is the probability of second-period quota of I? being imposed, as a 
function of the first-period;exports E. With optimal policy intervention in 
the situation with possible quota, the exports of the first period result in 
a value of P* for P(E). With laissez faire, the ex;i)rt-; in the first period will 
be different and the corresponding value for P(E) is i? 
p is the discount factor. 
&Q ‘=- (&JO” necessarily cnly for small countries with no influence on 
term5 of trade. 
OPT 
4NQ , when the country is optimally exercising its monoooly power in 
trade and then, is no .aR possi Glity, is not listed aboLe. ’ 
I 
___ __._ P.-e 
x2 : hpor table 
Fig. 1 
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3. Defining the 10s~ from market-disruption-induced QR-possibility 
Consider now the measure of the loss to the exporting country from this 
b possibility of a market-disruption-induced QA.. One can think of alternative ways 
in which this loss could be defined : 
Measure I: Taking expected utilities, one can define the loss of welfare to 
the exporting country as the difference between &o and & i.e. the loss in 
expected *welfare that follows, in the absence of optimal intervention by the 
exporting’country, from the QR-possibility. 
This measure clearly is pP (O-_U) and is, of course, nothing but the expected 
loss in period 2 from the possible imposition of the quota, duly discounted. 
Now, it is also clear that this measure will lie between the ex post period-2 
loss if the quota is invoked (which loss, duly discounted, is p(o-_U)) and the 
ex post period-2 loss if the quota is not invoked (which loss is, of course, zero). 
Thus, one must regard the actual period-2 loss when the quota is invoked as an 
upper bound on the loss in this model. ’ 
It also follows that there is a welfare loss, measured aspP{U-_V} even if the 
quota is not actualk’y invoked in period 2 and, (in our two-period model), the 
actual equilibrium allocations in each period are identical between the QR- 
possib3ity and the no-QR-possibility situations. This follows clearly from the 
fact hat, in period 1, consumers face the prospect ofuncertain prices in period i 
as the QR may or may not be invoked. 
Measure II: Alternatively one may measure the loss to the exporting country 
as the difference b tween (b$tT and #o opr : the difference b tween expected welfare 
when there is ilo QR possibility, but the optimal tariff to exploit monopoly 
power is being exercised, a&l that when the government of the exporting 
country intervenes with optimal policy to maximize expected welfare when there 
is a QR-possibility. This alternative measure would be more meaningful for 
exporting countries with governmental trade agencies orexporters’ associations 
with the ability to regulate their overall export levels, whereas Measure I would 
be more meaningful for exporting countries with (only) atomistic exporters. 
4. Adjusting for adjustment costs: A putty-clay model 
So far, our analysis was based on the assumption that the choice of optimal 
production in period 2 was not constrained by the choice of production i  
period 1. Thus, in fig. 1, the economy could move from PI or Pz in period 1 to P3 
in period 2, along the (long-run) transformation curve AB. However, this pro- 
cedure fails to take into consideration possible adjustment costs: i.e. we were 
essentially dealing with a putty model. 
However, this procedure eliminates an important aspect of the problem raised 
by market disruption. So, in this section, we modify our model and analysis to 
allow for adjustment costs. However, to simplify the analysis, we take initially 
of+ putty-clay mode& where the production choice made 
modi&d ~UU~JJ wacl)s in period 2, 
With this modikation, the choice variables now are:= &, the production of 
commodity i in periods t and 2 (i = I, 2); Es, the net exports of commodity 1 in 
period 1; and Ez, the net exports of commodity 1 in period 2 when no quota is 
imposed. As before, E is the net export of commodity 1 when the quota is 
imposed. Superscripts refer to periods 1and 2. 
Clearly then, the expected weIf= 4 is now as follows: 
4 = U'[X,-E,, X*+~E,]+PP(IE~)_V~[X~--E, x,+nE] 
+p(l-P(E,)}if2[XI-E,, X2+nE2]. 
This is then maximized subject o the implicit transformation function, 




=U~+pP(E,)v4+p{l-P(E,)I~:-~~~ = 0, 
w - = U:+pp((E~)v~+p(l-P(E,)}tiq-1F, = 0, 
ax, 
ad, - = p[- 
=2 











au[x, - E, x2 + nE] 
VJ 
9 
andA = the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the constraint, F(Xl , Xz) = 0. 
324 J.N. Bhugwati and T.N. Srintiasun, Qdrnal trade policy 
The interpretation of these first-order conditions i  straightforward. Condition 
(7) states that, given the optimalproductiori levels, the level of exports in period 2 
when o quota is imposed must be such as to equate the marginal rate of substitu- 
tion in consumption to the marginal terms of trade. Condition (6) is identical in 
form to the one obtained earlier: the optimal experts in period 1 must not 
equate the marginal rate of substitution i  consumption i  that period to the 
marginal terms of trade, but must instead also allow for the marginal change in 
expected welfare arising out of the change in probability of a quota being 
imposed - the latter equals P’(E,) (u2 -,u”), where o2 = U[& - E2, X2 -t zE,] 
and_U2 = U[X, -E, X2 + IZ]. Thus, condition (6) ensures the optimal choice of 
exports in period 1, given the production levels. Conditions (4) and (5) then relate 
to the optimal choice of production levels and, as we would expect, he introduc- 
tion of adjustment costs does make a difference. Writing (4) and (5) in the familiar 
ratio form, we get 
4 U; +pP(E,);rf +p{ 1 -P(E,)}uf 
K= U; +pP(E,)_U; +p{ 1 -P(E,)}u; l (8 
Clearly therefore the marginal rate of transformation i production (in periods 
1 and 2, identically, as production in period 1 will carry over into period 2 by 
assumption), i.e. FJF,, must not equal the margina! rate of substitution in 
consumption i  period 1, i.e. v,‘/Ui (unlike our earlier analysis without adjust- 
ment costs in sections 2and 3). Rather, Fl/F2 should equal a term which properly 
takes into account he fact that production choices once made in period 1 cannot 
be changed in period 2 to suit the state (i.e. the imposition or absence of a quota) 
obtaining in period 2. Eq. (8) can be readily interpreted as follows. 
The LHS is, of course, the marginal rate of transformation i production. 
The RMS represents the marginal rate of substitution in consumption, if
reinterpreted in the following sense. Suppose that the output of commodity 1, 
the exportable, is increased by one unit in period 1 (and hence in period 2 as 
well, by as;sumption). Given an optimal trade policy, then, the impact of this on 
welfare can be examined by adding it to consumption i each period. Thus social 
utility is increased in period 1 by Uf while in period 2 it wi11 increase by 8: if 
no quota is imposed and by _Vf if the quota is imposed. Thus, the discounted 
increase in period-2 expected welfare is given as p[_UfP(E,)+ ir:(l -P(E,))]. 
Thus, the total expected welfare impact of a unit increase in the production of 
eommodity- 1 is 
U; + p[ fP(E,) + o;(l - P(lQ)] . 
Similarly, a decrease in the production of commodity 2 by a unit in period 1 
(and hence in period 2 as well) reduces expected welfare by 
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Hence, the ratio of these two expressions, just derived, represents the ‘true’ 
marginal rate of substitution, and this indeed is the RHS in eq. (8) to which the 
marginal rate of transformation i production - F&, the LHS in eq. (8) - is 
to be equated for optimality. 
The optimal policy interventions in this modified model with adjustment costs 
are immediately evident from eqs. (6)-(8) and the preceding anafysis. Thus, 
in period 1, the ratio Uf /U’ is clearly the reIative price of commodity 1(in terms 
of commodity 2) facing consumers, while x(E,) is the average terms of trade. 
Thus Ui/Ui differs from z(El) by [A’E~--(~P’(E,){~~-ZJ~}/U~)] and this 
difference constitutes a consumption tax on the importable, commodity 2. An 
identical difference between FI/F2, the relative price facing producers, and z(E,) 
would define a production tax on commodity 2 at the same rate, so that a tariff 
at this rate would constitute the appropriate intervention i  the model with no 
adjustment costs. However, .csith mf’ustment costs, eq. (8) defines, for period 1, 
the appropriate production tax-cum-subsidy which, in general, will diverge from 
the appropriate consvmption tax: so that the optimal mix of policies in the model 
with adjustment costs will involve a tariff (reflecting both the monopoly power 
in trade and the QR possibility) I;!US a production tax-cum-subsidy in period I. ’ 
In period 2, in both the models (with and without adjustment costs), an appro- 
priate intervention i  the form of a tariff (to exploit monopoly power) would be 
called for; ho-,/ever, with production fixed at period 1 levels in the adjustment- 
cost model, a consumption tax-cum-subsidy would equally suffice. Specifically, 
note that in period 2, with adjustment costs, the price ratio facing consumers 
would be 8:/u; if no quota is imposed, with the average terms of trade at 
7i(E2) and the producer’s price ratio (as defined along the putty-transformation 
frontier) would be &IF, ; on the other hand, if the quota is imposed, these values 
change ‘to _Uf/gg, K(E) and FI/F2 respectively. The consumption tax-cum- 
sut:sidy and the equivalent ariff (with no impact on production decision 
already frozen at period-l levels) are then defined by those divergences, depend- 
ing on whether the quota obtains or not. 
A ubular comparison of the characteristics of the optimal solution, with and 
without adjustment costs, is presented in table 2 and should assist he reader. 
Note that the above results are quite consistent with the basic propositions 
of the theory of distortions, as de\.eIoped in Bhagwati-Ramaswami (1963), 
Johnson (1965) and Bhagwati (1971): the first-best, optimal policy intervention 
for the case with adjustment costs requires atrade policy to adjust for the foreign 
distortion (represented by the effect of current exports on the period-2 probe- 
bility of a quota being invoked)6 and a production tax-cum-subsidy to adjust 
51t should be pointed out that atomistic firms in period 1 are assumed to respond to that 
period’s prices only. This assumption can be justified on the ground that they are likely to 
assume that these prices will carry over into the next period, since there is no other, obvious 
mechanism by which they can anticipate the ‘true’ period 2 prices. 
% addition, of course, to the usual optimal tariff if there is also monopoly power in trade. 
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for the existence of adjustment costs in production. It also follows, from the 
equivalence propositions, that the combination of the optimal tariff and the 
optimal production tax-cum-subsidy can be reproduced i entically by a tariff 
set at the ‘net’ production tax-cum-subsidy required by the optimal solution plus 
a cc>nsumption ax-cum-subsidy. Similarly, while our 
on first-best policy intervention, the fund~en~J res 
tions and welfare on second-best policies also ca 
problem. Thus, if there are zero adjustment costs o that there is only the foreign 
distortion in period 1, then clearly a production tax-cum-subsidy will&PZ,JW~W 
(but not maximize) welfare. Similarly, if there are adjustment oosts as well, then 
there will be two distortions, and then applicable here would be the Bhagwati- 
Ramaswami-Srinivasan (1969) proposition that no feasible, welfare-improving 
form of intervention may exist if both of the policy measures that will secure 
optimal intervention cannot be used simultaneously. 
Table 2 
Characteristics of optimal solutions inmodels with and without adjustment costs? 
No adjustment costs Adjustment costs 
Period 1 
Period 2 
DRSI # FRTI 
DRS, = DRT, 
OR& = DRTa 
= FRTr 
DM, # FRTZ 
DR.91 # DRT, 
DA& = FRTa 
(DRTa not relevant as production is 
frozen at period-l evels) 
‘D RS, DRYand FRT represent the mar&al rates of substitution in consumption, domestic 
transformation, a d foreign transformation respectively. Forft? earlier use of these abbrevia- 
tions see Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969). Since we are considering aninterior 
maximum, the inequalities donot include comer equilibria, of course. The subscripts refer to 
the periods, 1and 2, 
5, Adjustment costs: A general formulatiorr 
So far, we have considered only the extreme version of an adjustment-costs 
model, where the period-l production levels arc frozen in period 2, We may now 
briefly consider however a more neral formulation, (with basically the same 
results, of course, for optimal policy intervention), where the clay nature of 
period 1 allocation is partially relaxed: some reallocation is now permitted in
period 2, 
The simplest way to do this is to write out the period-2 implicit ransformation 
function as @[x:, xi, X,’ , Xi] = 0 for the quota case and as [x:,x;, Xi, x: 
= 0 for the no-quota case, such that the feasible output levels in period 2are ex- 
plicitly made a function of the (alkation-cum-) output levels of period 1, Xi 
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and A’:. Our we&e probkm tben becomes one OS maximizing, ’ 
subject to: _ 
F(X;, Xl) = 0, 
forperiod 1; 
GiixL mf 9 x,’ I x:1 = 
for period 2, with quota imposed; 
c[x;,x;, xi, Xi] = 
for period 2, with no quota imposed; and 
E2 S E, 
where 2 is the quota level. 
The first-order conditions for an interior maximum then are 
(12) 
‘The underbar and tk _ overbar efer to the quota aad no-quota values respectively. 
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z = -U’+(n+a’E1)U~-p[~2-~2]~‘(~1) = 0, 
at6 
a_E, = ~P(E,)[-_U:S(~+I~‘E,)_UI]-~ = 0, (20) 
where kl, A2, 1, and y are the Lagrangean multipliers associated with constraints 
(9~(12) respectively, and Gt is the partial derivative with respect o the ith 
argument. 
It is then easy to see that, while DRS2 = DRT2 (because qs. (15) and (16) -_- -- 
imply that I.Ji/ai = _GI,G2j and DRS2 = Dx (because qs. (17) and (18) 
imply that 8:/O; = E,IG,), as before, one can see the effect of adjustment costs 





Now, it is easy to see that, if we have the polar case with no reallocation possible 
in period 2 (the putty-clay model of section 4), the transformation curve in period 
2 reduces to the single point (Xi, X’). As such, the partial derivatives _G1, Gi 
( 
. 
= 1,2,3,4) are not defined. However, one could define G in such a way that 
lktty-clay is a limiting c_~ and, in the limit, C3 = ,Gs = -G, and G4 = 
G4 = - G2. This is analogous to obtaining the Leontief ixed coefficient produc- 
tion function as a limiting case of the CES production function. Therefore, 
eq (22’) reduces to eq. (8), as it should. If, however, we have no adjustment costs 
(as in section 2), then Gj = Gj = G, = ,G4 = 0 and eq. (22’) will reduce to 
Wu; = Fl/F2 (which is what eqs. (1) and (2) imply in section 2). For any 
situation with some, but not total, inflexibility of resource allocation in period 2, 
the ratios -,Gs/,G1, - G&, - _G,/_G 2 and - G,IG2 will lie between 0 and 1. 
The parametric values of these ratios will clearly reflect the ‘pattern of 
inflexibility’ that one contends with. Thus, if one assumes total factor price 
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flexibility but no resource mobility, as in Haberler (1950), then the putty-clay 
model is relevant. On the other hand, one might assume just the opposite, where 
factor prices are inflexible but resources are fully mobile - this being the case 
systematically analyzed by Brecher (1974). Variations on these two polar possi- 
bilities include analyses uch as that of Mayer (1974) which assumes an activity- 
specific factor with no mobility in the sh+ run (interpret ‘short run’ as period 2 
for our purposes) but with factor price flexibility. 
Whatever the source of adjustment costs in period 2, what they do imply is 
that the transformation curve of period 1 is not feasible in period 2. Hence the 
illustration of optimal-policy equilibrium in period 2 would be as in fig. 2, where 
AB is the (putty) period-l transformation curve, f’ the production point on it 
in period 1 representing therefore (X,‘, if:>, CP’D the clay transformation 
curve for period 2 and QPlR the (partial-clay) transformation curve when 
resources in period 2 are partially mobile. With equilibrium production at P’ 
0 D R B x2: Importable - 
Fig. 2 
(with tangency in period 1 to AB) and consumption at Cl, and assuming for 
simplicity that the international terms of trade are fixed at PiCi, we can then 
illustrate that F,I-F, J: U#lj (i.e. that the tangents to AB and to the social 
utility curve U1 are not equal), as required by eq. (22’) for the case of adjustment 
costs. 
6. Steady state analysis: Infinite time horizon 
So far, we have worked with a 2-period horizon, where the uncertainty 
essentially obtains in period 1 and is resolved in period 2. However, it would be 
useful to consider an infinite-time-horizon model where each pe*iod can face 
unresolved uncertainty. In this section, therefore, we consider now an infinite- 
time-horizon steady state analysis of our basic model. 
However, to simplify the analysis, we will assume that the quota, oace imposed, 
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will not be lifted. The analysis therefore applies to the case where the prospect of 
a quota being levied is not certain but the prospect hat, once levied, it will 
persist is certain: a situation that is fairly approximated by commodities/items 
falling within the scope of, .say, the long-term agreement on textiles, and other 
similar commodities. 
Thus, consider now that, aside from a quota persisting forever once invoked, 
the probability of a quota being invoked in any period depends only on the level 
of exports in the previous period, and that this relationship remains invariant 
over time. Further, assume that the chance of the event of a quota not being 
invoked in any period is independent of the same event in the previous periods. 
Then it is clear that, in the event hat the quota is not imposed in any period, 
the optimal production and trade policies in that period will be the same regard- 
less of the calendar time at which this event occurs. 
Let us then start from an initial period at which the quota is not in force, and 
Jet W[&, X2, E] denote the discounted sum of expected welfare levels at all 
future points, given that the production and export levels are X1, X2 and E 
respectively. In other words9 IV is the welfare associated with the stationary 
policy (Xl, X2, .E) in any period in which no quota has been imposed till then. 
It then follows (as will be demonstrated below) that 
W= VIX,-E,X2+nE]+p{~-P(E)JW+PP(E)U. 
l-p (23) 
This is seen as follows. The policy (X1, X2, E) yields a utility of U[X, -E, 
X,+zEJ in the first period. In the second period, if the quota is not imposed 
(the probability of which event is 1 -P(E)), the policy is again (Xi D X2, E) so 
that one can regard the welfare from that point on as ‘W[Xr , X2, E] as in 
period 1, This IV would however have to be discounted back to the first period, 
thus yielding the second term on the RHS of eq. (23): ~(1 -P(E)} IV. However, if
the quota is imposed in the second period, (the probability of which event is 
P(E)), the optimal policy from then on remains the same (as the quota persists 
forever by assumption) and yields welfare g in each perioA The discounted sum 
of this series is clearly -Up/( 1 - p), so that the result is t3 yield the third term 
on the RHS of eq- (23) : [p/( 1 - p)]P(E)_U. 
In the following analysis, note first that the maximizing procedure will, as 
before, be different for the cases with and without adjustment costs. In the case 
where adjustment costs are zero, ,U will be obtained by maximizing 
U[& -E, & +?rE] with respect to zl, & subject o F(&, &) = 0, and where 
E is the specified quota. In the case where there are adjustment costs, however, 
A”’ and X2 cannot be altered (aftogether, if we take the putty-clay model) once 
chosen; hence ,U must be defined as U[& -E$ X2 + xE], the optimal X” and X2 
now being cl2osen so as to maximize W[X, , X2, EJ. 
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6. I. Zero a@stment costs 
In this case, we must now maximize 
subject to 
F(Xl, X2) = 0. 
RecPing that, in &is case, u does not depend on Xl, Xz and E, we can derive 
the &rrt*order conditions for an interior maximum : 
ilW u2 













= 0. (26) 
As one would expect, eqs. (24) and (25) imply, (given that 1 - p( 1 -P(E)) > 0), 
that V,/U, = Fl/F2, so that DRSl = DRTi . And, rewriting eq. (26) as 
-u~+(n+7m)u2-- PWN~-VI 0 
I-p(l -P(E)) = ’ 
I (26 1 
we can see that Ul/U2 differs from the marginal terms of trade (n +dE) by the 
term pP’(E)( U- ,V)/( 1 B p{ 1 -P(E))) and hence the optimal policy intervention 
is a tariff that suitably corresponds to the difference between VI/U2 and n. 
This result, of course, is identical to that derived in the two-period model, 
except hat the infinite time horizon model leads to a different ariff rate. In 
particular, this difference arising from the fact that a quota may be imposed at 
any time in the future, with probability P(E),. reflects itselfin the tariff term in two 
ways: (ij the utility in a period in which no quota is imposed is now U, whereas 
L 
B 
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27 (> U) is the maximum feasible utility and enters the tariff for the two-period 
case in &. (3’); and (ii) the term { 1 -p(l -P(E))} now enters the denominator. 
This difference iscommented on below. 
We now must maximize 
subject to F( Xl, .X2) = 0. 
The &t-order conditions for an interior maximum now are: 
= 0. (29 
S&e (1 -p(l -P(E))) > 0, we then get . I 
(31) 
*We shoufd note? of course, that the assumption of ‘adjustment costs’ in the infinite time 
horbn case makes little sense as all realloca$ions should presumably be possible in this case. 
This subsection istherefore retained only from the viewpoint of completeness of the theoretical 
argument. 
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Hence, it is evident from eq. (30) that, as in the two-period model of sections 4
and 5, the introduction of adjustment costs results in establishing a wedge 
between the marginal rate of transformation, FI/F2, in any period and the 
marginal rate of substitution in coasumption (&/ET2 or ,V,/&, depending on 
whether the quota has not, or has, been imposed). And; eq. (31) shows that the 
&t-order condition relating to exports (E) continues to be of the same essential 
form as in the case without adjustment costs.g 
6.3. Welfave comparisons 
Confkkrg ourselves to the simpler case of zero adjustment costs, we can now 
see that, in the infinite time horizon model, laissez f&ire will lead to a welfare 
level (given that a quota may be imposed at any time) of 
where 
U= Max VI&-E, X2+nE19 
x1,x2, E 
subj\ect to F(X’, X2) = 0, and e is the corresponding optimal export level; and 
g= Max U[&-E, &+ItE], 
X1,X2, E 
subjlect to F(&, X2) = 0 and E 5 E. 
The same laissez i’aire policy, when the probability of a quota being imposed 
is zero, will clearly lead to the welfare level: 
WL 
B 
NQ =l_p* (33 
Finally, the optimal-policy solution to the situation with the probability of a 
quota being imposed leads to the welfare level: 
gThe v values, in the two cases, 
QfEbe equal in the two ca!Ses. 
u* + p _v.pE*) 
W,o_ = 1-P 
n-p{l-P(E*>} ’ 
will Iwt of COUP% be equal. Nor, of course, wit1 the values 
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where U* = U[Q-E+, X’+nE+]and Xf, X8, E*maximize 
U[&-E, &+xElf~ &‘P(E) 
1-P 
1 m PC1 -PO) 
-9 
subject toF(&, XJ = 0. 
Celarly, then, we have the ranking: 
6.4. Interpret@ the difserence between ihfiite-ti and two-petkd 
results 
In. concluding the analysis of section 6, it would be usefu1 to comment on the 
difference in the optimal tariffs that obtains between the inbite time horizon and 
the two-period models, that was noted explicitly above for the simpler case of 
zero adjustment costs. 
For this purpose, it is best o take the two-period model and to turn it ir;to an 
infinite time horizon model by assuming that, in the second period, tie uxer- 
tainty is resolvedfitty forever: i.e. that, whether the quota is imposed in perbd 2 
or not, that will also be the case thereafter. In this event, welfare will continue 
to be g (or fT), depending on whether the quota is (or is not) imposed. And, 
discounted to the present, his yields a welfare of pyI(1 -p) (or pU/(l -p)). 
Thus the maximand becomes 
ind yields the following first-order conditions for an 




On the other hand, in the infinite time horizon model with continuing uncer- 
tainty as to whether a quota, still not imposed, will be imposed or not (as in this 
section), the equivalent conditions were derived as eqs, (24)$ (29, and (26’). To 
contrast this case with the preceding case of infinite time horizon with uncertainty 
resolved in @od 2, we wJ use a tilde (“1 to 
resolved untinty. 
@Q-(26’), shows that the 
of equations [of cour$e 
But eq. (38), in turn, implies $0 + 
since U > 0 > J;! and 1 -jI(l -P(E)) > 0. Thu, we must have p < fi, for the 
two infW+time-horizon cases, without and with unresolved uncertainty, to
yield identical results (i.e. values of Xl9 X2 and E’). It is easy to see now that the 
residual-uncertainty model has a larger disoount factor @“) than the resolved- 
uncertainty model (p): as one would expect, he risk involved in the unresolved- 
uncertainty case has to be compensated by lowering the discount rate (or by 
incre4ising the discouno fkctor). 
The preceding analysis of the phenomenon of market-disruption-induced 
QR-imposition can be shown both to have other applications and to be general- 
izable in many directions. 
Thus, it is readily seen that the phenomenon f a trade hmBilrgcz on a country’s 
import8 can be analyzed inthe same way as the market-disruption phenomenon. 
The analysis, and result& would in fact be identical if we were to assume that 
the probability of the imposition of an export embargo (e.g. by OPEC) by the 
exporting country was an increasing function of the import level by the importing 
country (e.g. import of oil by the W.S.).‘0 jln this case, the optimal policy inter- 
vention by the importing country, faced by such an (import-level-related) 
embargo-prospect of reduced (or eliminated) feasible impo level, would be a 
trade tariff if there were no afiiuqtment costs, and a trade tar#plus production 
tax-cum-subsidy if there wep J adjustment costs as welt. The analysis would 
however have to be sli modified if the embargo problem were modeled 
1 OThe economic rationale for this assumption isthat the probaMity of the exporter 
an export embargo may be a function of the ‘import dependence’ of the importer. 
invobin 
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rather as on2 where the probability of the exporting country allowing reduced, 
pemnissible xports were made a function instead of the ratio of imports to 
domestic production (a,s this may be a better index of import dependence). In 
this case, since the probability of the quota being invoked-is now a function of 
a ratio involving b&z trade and production levels, one should expect hat the 
optimum tariff would now be replaced by a combi~&~ of a tarSand a produc- 
tion tzxcum-subsidy, on this account ((even i  the absence of adjustment costs). 
Finally, if one models the probability of an embargo imposition as independent 
of a country’s trade level or import&-production ratio,‘so that the uncertainty 
is exug~~ous, then clearly the optimal policy for a small country (with no mono- 
poly pswer in trade:) is free trade with zero adjustment costs and, if there are 
adjustment costs, it will consist of a production tax-cum-subsidy related to these 
adjustment costs. 
As fcr the generalizations of our analysis in other directions, we may indicate 
some. ‘I’hus, for example, an important extension would be to incorporat\= tech- 
nical change as a source of export expansion and hence accentuated probilbility 
of a triggering of market-disruption-induced QR’s: this would provid? yet 
another instance of immiserizing rowth, while also carrying implications for 
optimal imports of technology in developing countries, to mention only two 
possible nnalytically4nteresting consequences. Again, our analysis has explicitly 
modeled only the exporting country as far as welfare implications of the market-. 
disruption phenomenon are concerned. However, one could take a ‘world- 
welfare’ lqpproach and model the importing country also more explicitly. If this 
was done, then one could no longer meaningfully take the importing country’s 
QR-imposition policy as “given,’ and the basic model of this paper would have 
to be modifU in an essential manner. 
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